Far-reaching strategic debate is underway about how to respond to the
global financial crisis, and indeed how the North's problems can be
tied into a broader critique of capitalism.
At minimum, the ongoing chaos offers new ideological space and material
justifications for African finance ministries to re-impose exchange
controls and re-regulate finance, and to find sources of hard currency
not connected to the Bretton Woods Institutions or Western donors.
The 2008 world financial meltdown has its roots in the neoliberal
export-model (dominant in Africa since the Berg Report and onset of
structural adjustment during the early 1980s) and even more deeply, in
thirty-five years of world capitalist stagnation/volatility. As South
Centre director (and Ugandan political economist) Yash Tandon put it:
‘The first lesson, surely, is that contrary to mainstream thinking, the
market does not have a self-corrective mechanism.‘ Such
disequilibration means that Africa receives sometimes too much and
often too little in the way of financial flows, and the inexorable
result during periods of turbulence is intensely amplified uneven
development. Africa has always suffered a disproportionate share of
pressure from the world economy, especially in the sphere of debt and
financial outflows. But for those African countries that made
themselves excessively vulnerable to global financial flows during the
neoliberal era, the meltdown had a severe, adverse impact.
In Africa's largest national economy, for example, South African
finance minister Trevor Manuel had presided over steady erosion of
exchange controls (with 26 consecutive relaxations from 1995-2008,
according to the Reserve Bank) and the emergence of a massive current
account deficit: nine percent in 2008, the second worst in the world.
The latter was in large part due to a steady outflow of profits and
dividends to corporations formerly based at the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange but which re-listed in Britain, the USA or Australia during
the 1990s (Anglo American, DeBeers, Old Mutual, Didata, Mondi, Liberty
Life, BHP Billiton). In the second week of October 2008, South Africa's
stock market crashed 10 percent (on the worst day, shares worth $35
billion went up in smoke) and the currency declined by nine percent,
while the second week witnessed a further 10 percent crash. The
speculative real estate market had already begun a decline that might
yet reach those of other hard-hit property sectors like the US, Denmark
and Ireland, because South Africa's early 2000s housing price rise far
outstripped even these casino markets (200 percent from 1997-2004,
compared to 60 percent in the US).
On the other hand, the cost of market failure could at least be offset,
somewhat, by ideological advance. The main gains so far were in
delegitimating the economic liberalisation philosophy adopted during
the 1994-2008 governments of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki (presided
over by Manuel). Indeed Mbeki's dramatic September 2008 departure
occurred partly because of substantially worsened inequality and
unemployment since 1994, which in turn was responsible for thousands of
social protests each year. When a solidarity letter Manuel wrote,
resigning from Mbeki's government on its second-last day, was released
to the press (by Mbeki)) on 23 September, the stock and currency
markets imposed a $6 billion punishment within an hour. The crash
required incoming caretaker president Kgalema Motlanthe to immediately
reappoint Manuel with great fanfare.
In the same spirit, Mbeki's replacement as ruling party president,
Jacob Zuma, had visited Davos and paid tribute to Merrill Lynch and
Citibank in 2007-08 (ironically the latter two institutions insisted on
having their jitters calmed). Zuma assured international financiers
that Manuel's economic policy would not change. Hence the opening of
ideological space to contest neoliberalism in practice became a crucial
struggle for the trade unions and SA Communist Party, which in
mid-October held an Alliance Economic Summit that suggested Manuel make
only marginal shifts at the edges of neoliberalism.
However, as the financial meltdown unfolded in the US and Europe, the
merits of South Africa's residual capital controls became clearer. As
SA deputy trade minister Rob Davies wrote approvingly in the main
Communist journal: ‘Interestingly, The Business Times of 21 September
attributed this [safety from contagion] partly to "exchange control"'
which meant ‘there is a healthy degree of trapped liquidity within the
financial system.' Another factor was that many exotic financial
products had been banned. As a leading official of the central bank,
Brian Kahn, explained:
‘The interbank market is functioning normally and the Reserve Bank has
not had to make any special liquidity provision. We have a relatively
sophisticated and well-developed banking sector, and the question then
is, what has saved us? (This may be tempting fate, so perhaps I should
say what has saved us so far?) This all raises the old question whether
or not exchange controls work. The conventional wisdom is that they do
not, particularly when you need them to work. We seem to have been
exception to this rule. It turns out that we were protected to some
extent by prudent regulation by the Bank regulators, but more
importantly, and perhaps ironically, from controls on capital movements
of banks. Despite strong pressure to liberalise exchange controls
completely, the Treasury has adopted a policy of gradual relaxation
over the years. Controls on non-residents were lifted completely in
1996, but controls on residents, including banks and other
institutions, were lifted gradually, mainly through raising limits over
time. With respect to banks, there are restrictions in terms of the
exchange control act, on the types of assets or asset classes they may
get involved in (cross-border). These include leveraged products and
certain hedging and derivative instruments. For example banks cannot
hedge transactions that are not SA linked. Effectively it meant that
our banks could not get involved in the toxic assets floating that
others were scrambling into. They would have needed exchange control
approval which would not have been granted, as they did not satisfy
certain criteria. The regulators were often criticised for being behind
the times, while others have argued that they don't understand the
products, but it seems there may be advantages to that! Our banks are
finding it more difficult to access foreign funds and we have seen some
spikes in overnight foreign exchange rates at times. But generally
everything seems ‘normal' on the banking front... Our insurance companies
and institutional investors were also protected to some extent, in that
there is a prudential limit on how much they can invest abroad (15 per
cent of assets), and the regulator in this instance (the Financial
Services Board) places constraints on the types of finds or products
they can invest in. (Generally it appears that exotics are excluded).
One large South Africa institution, Old Mutual, moved its primary
listing to the UK a few years back (when controls were relaxed), and
the plc has had fairly significant exposure in the US.'
Demands for deeper exchange controls were made by the South African
Communist Party (SACP). And as Riaz Tayob of Third World Network points
out, Manuel has been terribly irresponsible in pushing further
financial services deregulation through the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
As for the rest of Africa, similar opportunities to contest financial
system orthodoxy now arise. At this stage, it is practically impossible
for staff from the most powerful external force in African economic
policy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to advise elites with
any credibility. The IMF's October 2006 Global Financial Stability
Report, after all, claimed that global bankers had shown ‘resilience
through several market corrections, with exceptionally low market
volatility.' Moreover, global economic growth ‘continued to become more
balanced, providing a broad underpinning for financial markets.'
Because financial markets always price risk correctly, according to IMF
dogma, investors could relax: ‘[D]efault risk in the financial and
insurance sectors remains relatively low, and credit derivatives
markets do not indicate any particular financial stability concerns.'
The derivatives and in particular mortgage-backed securities ‘have been
developed and successfully implemented in U.S. and U.K. markets. They
allow global investors to obtain broader credit exposures, while
targeting their desired risk-reward trade-off.' As for the rise of
credit default swaps (the $56 trillion house of cards bringing down one
bank after the other), the IMF was not worried, because ‘the widening
of the credit default swaps spreads [i.e. the pricing in of higher
risk] across mature markets was gradual and mild, and spreads remain
near historic lows.'
Fast forward to the April 2008 launch of the IMF's ‘Regional Economic
Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa' study. IMF Africa staffer John
Wakeman-Linn's powerpoint slideshow, ‘Private Capital Flows to
Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Globalization's Final Frontier?',
concluded that the vast rush of finance is generally good for Africa,
but policies would have to be changed - making Africa more vulnerable
to the international financial system - in order to take full advantage:
- More transparency and consistency: exchange controls in sub-Saharan Africa complex and difficult to implement.
- Gradual and well-sequenced liberalisation strategy can help limit risks associated with capital inflows.
• Accelerated liberalisation in the face of large inflows may help
their monitoring (e.g. Tanzania); selective liberalisation of outflows
may help relieve inflation and appreciation pressures, but further work
needed on modalities.
The IMF proclaimed the merits of liberalisation and rising financial
flows to Africa, especially portfolio funding (i.e., short-term hot
money in the forms of stocks, shares and securities issued by companies
and government in local currencies but readily convertible). Such ‘hot
money' - speculative positions by private-sector investors - flowed
especially into South Africa's stock exchange, and also to a lesser
extent into share markets in Ghana, Kenya, Gabon, Togo, and Seychelles.
However, financial outflows continue apace. An updated report on
capital flight by Leonce Ndikumana of the Economic Commission for
Africa and James Boyce of the University of Massachusetts shows that
thanks to corruption and the demise of most African countries' exchange
controls, the estimated capital flight from 40 sub-Saharan African
countries from 1970-2004 was at least $420 billion (in 2004 dollars).
The external debt owed by the same countries in 2004 was $227 billion.
Using an imputed interest rate to calculate the real impact of flight
capital, the accumulated stock rises to $607 billion. According to
Ndikumana and Boyce:
‘Adding to the irony of SSA's position as net creditor is the fact that
a substantial fraction of the money that flowed out of the country as
capital flight appears to have come to the subcontinent via external
borrowing. Part of the proceeds of loans to African governments from
official creditors and private banks has been diverted into private
pockets - and foreign bank accounts - via bribes, kickbacks, contracts
awarded to political cronies at inflated prices, and outright theft.
Some African rulers, like Congo's Mobutu and Nigeria's Sani Abacha,
became famous for such abuses. This phenomenon was not limited to a few
rogue regimes. Statistical analysis suggests that across the
subcontinent the sheer scale of debt-fueled capital flight has been
staggering. For every dollar in external loans to Africa in the
1970-2004 period, roughly 60 cents left as capital flight in the same
year. The close year-to-year correlation between flows of borrowing and
capital flight suggests that large sums of money entered and exited the
region through a financial "revolving door".'
Where did this leave African debtors in 2008? According to the IMF, the
‘debt sustainability outlook' of low-income African countries ‘has
improved substantially, with 21 out of 34 countries classified on the
basis of the Debt Sustainability Framework at a low or moderate risk of
debt distress at end-2007.' Yet the major lesson from the prior
quarter-century of debt distress was not the abstract ratios, but
instead, the ability to pay the debt in the context of pressing human
needs. It was here, according to London-based Jubilee Research, that
the Bretton Woods institutions had not accurately assessed the damage
done by debt, or the injustice associated with repaying debt inherited
from prior undemocratic governments:
‘Current [mid-2008] approaches to debt relief (HIPC and MDRI for poor
countries, and Paris and London Club renegotiations for middle income
countries) are not solving the problems of Third World indebtedness.
HIPC and MDRI are reducing debt burdens but only for a small range of
countries and after long delays, and at a high cost in terms of loss of
policy space. While non-HIPC poor countries continue to have major debt
problems and middle-income country indebtedness continues to grow. The
present approach is marred by the involvement of creditors as judge,
prosecution and jury in direct conflict with natural justice and by the
failure to take into account either the human rights of the people of
debtor nations or the moral obscenity of odious debt. It is all too
little and too late... Even after the debt relief already granted under
HIPC and MDRI, 47 countries need 100% debt cancellation on this basis
and a further 34 to 58 need partial cancellation, amounting to $334 to
$501 billion in net present value terms, if they are to get to a point
where debt service does not seriously affect basic human rights.'
Hence the system of debt peonage remains, and the only prospect for its
relief is the weakening of Washington's power, along with the
overhauling of the aid system that is so closely connected to debt (for
the richest set of recommendations, see Yash Tandon's work). The Accra
Agenda for Action (AAA) conference in September 2008 provided an
opportunity to address the problems of donor/financier
cross-conditionality, ‘phantom aid' (including tied aid), corruption,
waste, economic distortions and political manipulation, as well as to
add the South's demand for repayment of the North's ecological debt to
the South. But the opportunity was lost, and even mild-mannered NGOs
realised they were wasting their time, as a staffer at Civicus,
Nastasya Tay, revealed:
‘A colleague from a major international NGO gave an excellent summary
of the whole High Level Forum process: "Why should I attend
interminably long meetings, to passionately lobby for reform, when
countries like the US and Japan are refusing to sign on because of some
"language issues" with the AAA? In the end, we will have worked
incredibly hard to, if we're lucky, change a few words. And it's just
another document".'
Hence, for some African countries, the solution lies in an alternative
source of hard currency finance. It is not only China who provides
condition-free loans to several of Africa's most authoritarian regimes.
More hopefully, Venezuela is considering a proposal to replace and
displace the IMF, as happened in Argentina in 2006, in which case
repaying the IMF early or even defaulting would be feasible. In other
African countries, progressive social movements have argued for debt
repudiation and are concerned about any further financial inflows
beyond those required for trade financing of essential inputs. This
would also entail inward-oriented light industrialisation oriented to
basic needs (and not to luxury goods, a major problem that emerged in
Africa's settler colonial economies during the 1960s-70s).
The crucial ingredient for establishing an alternative African
financing strategy from the Left is pressure from below. This means the
strengthening, coordination and increased militancy of two kinds of
civil society: those forces devoted to the debt relief cause, which
have often come from what might be termed an excessively polite,
civilised society based in internationally-linked NGOs which rarely if
ever used ‘tree shaking' in order to do ‘jam making' and; those forces
which react via short-term ‘IMF Riots' against the system, in a manner
best understood as uncivilised society. The IMF riots that shook
African countries during the 1980s-90s often, unfortunately, rose up in
fury and even shook loose some governments' hold on power. When these,
however, contributed to the fall of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia (one of
many examples), the man who replaced him as president in 1991, former
trade unionist Frederick Chiluba, imposed even more decisive IMF
policies. Most anti-IMF protest simply could not be sustained.
In contrast, the former organisations are increasingly networked,
especially in the wake of 2005 activities associated with the Global
Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP), which generated (failed)
strategies to support the Millennium Developmental Goals partly through
white-headband consciousness raising, through appealing to national
African elites and through joining a naïve appeal to the G8 Gleneagles
meeting. Since then, networks tightened and became more substantive
through two Nairobi events: the January 2007 World Social Forum and
August 2008 launch of Jubilee South's Africa network. These networks
could return to the cul-de-sac of GCAP's ‘reformist reforms' - i.e., to
recall Andre Gorz's phrase, making demands squarely within the logic of
the existing neoliberal system and its geopolitical power relations, in
a manner that disempowers activists if they gain slight marginal
changes.
Or they could embark upon ‘non-reformist reform' challenges, by
identifying sites where the logic of finance can be turned upside down.
The most striking case might have been the South African ‘bond boycott'
campaign of the early 1990s, wherein activists in dozens of townships
offered each other solidarity when collective refusal to repay housing
mortgage bonds was the only logical reaction. This forewarned the
1995-96 ‘El Barzón' (‘the yoke') strategy of more than a million
Mexicans who were in debt when interest rates soared from 14 to 120
percent over a few days in early 1995: they simply said, ‘can't pay,
won't pay'. That slogan was also heard in Argentina in early 2002,
following the evictions of four presidents in a single week due to
popular protest. The ongoing pressure from below compelled the
government to default on $140 billion in foreign debt so as to maintain
some of the social wage, the largest such default in history.
At the time of writing, a November 2008 summit was called by the G8 in
New York, to refashion the world's financial architecture, likely
adding China, India, Brazil and South Africa for legitimacy (and access
to substantial dollar reserves). Activists began contemplating whether
to ‘Seattle' the event (shut it down with protest); African social
movements and a few patriotic African trade ministers were, after all,
not only present but instrumental in preventing the World Trade
Organization's Seattle summit from proceeding nine years earlier. A
serious danger for civil society would be to settle for a UN-sponsored
event full of reformist reforms. Enormous damage to Southern finances
was caused by the 2002 precedent set in Monterrey at the UN Financing
for Development conference, which had as key UN advisors Michel
Camdessus (former IMF managing director) and Trevor Manuel.
Instead, much more forthright national action can be taken, spurred by
far-seeing civil society activists, such as those who demand
reparations for apartheid, colonialism, slavery and ‘ecological debt'
owed by the North to the South. Africa needs to re-impose national
exchange controls and import controls (especially on luxury goods for
the elites), as installed successfully by Malaysia, Chile and Venezuela
in recent years.
As commodity prices plunge from their 2002-07 speculation-driven bubble
prices, as trade deals with the North are unveiled as clearly
disadvantageous and as trade finance becomes difficult as a result of
bank mistrust of counterparty debt, and as the hot money portfolio
flows dry up and new sources open for hard currency, the argument for
what Samir Amin calls ‘delinking' and Walden Bello terms
‘deglobalisation' becomes all the more compelling. The evidence above
suggests it is already beginning to happen, in no small part thanks to
civil society advocacy.
This article was first published in Pambazuka News, which has been voted one of the the top websites for 2008 in the annual 'Top 10 Who Are Changing the World of Internet and Politics' award organised by PoliticsOnline and eDemocracy Forum.
|