This is a bid to tame the influential forces of World Bank's commercial arm, an arm whose frenzied and almost maniacal foray into asset stripping and 'advisory services' has become common-place in the media. A a result African nations led by Nigeria are looking to set up an independent financial organization that will be owned and controlled by them and that will be tasked with spurring development on the continent.

Africa's much heralded economic growth is proving very attractive overseas, and the financiers behind the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank are paying ever more attention to Africa, where they foresee high returns in lending and advisory services or increasingly even, in stripping down assets for sale.

In Kenya we have seen the IFC play an active role, so active in fact that it ended up dictating the terms, in the Rift Valley Railways deal. Here the organization failed Kenya when it did not properly vet the South African company that ended up winning the bid to run our railways for the next 25 years. The corporation is also reaping high fees from its advisory services on parastatals privatization, especially with regard to Telkom Kenya. These scenarios have been acted out repeatedly across the continent leading many to wonder just who it is that actually benefits in the long run from the IFC's involvement on the continent.

It is with this skewed relationship in my mind that Nigeria's Central Bank governor recently published the idea of a continental independent financial services organization, one that would take the place of the IFC. The continent however, already has a bank in the form of the now Tunis based Africa Development Bank so the need for a new organization is not immediately clear.

The key roles of ADB are defined in its charter as follows. The first is to make loans and equity investments for the economic and social advancement of the Regional Member Countries. Second, it is to provide technical assistance for the preparation and execution of development projects and programs. Third, the ADB is charged with promoting the investment of public and private capital for development purposes. Lastly, the ADB is required to assist in coordinating development policies and plans of RMCs affording special attention on national and multinational projects and programs which promote regional integration.

Are these the same functions the intended AFC would provide? That seems to be the case with officials from Nigeria's Central Bank being cited calling for a bank that would finance development of infrastructure like roads and electricity projects as well as exports, a corporation that would help African countries to improve their productive bases and accelerate the pace of economic development in the continent.

Could the fact that these institutions lack a 'profit' motive be the key disincentive to pushing their performance higher? It is difficult it is true to systematically quantify the impact the ADB has had in the continent as whole , but looking at the sterling performance of Equity Bank and K-Rep at the grassroots makes for a persuasive case that the value-chain of these development banks needs greater devolution to the grassroots.

The IFC can be commended on this count for taking up equity in and supporting Equity Bank, and leveraging on this position to increase both the quantity and quality of the loans available to the poor. Thus, at one fell it was able not just to increase efficiency but also to serve a social improvement motive. Also commendable are IFC is also engaged in projects currently, geared towards allowing technical capability for local governments' floatation of infrastructure bonds such as municipal bonds in South Africa and Kenya.

However, it is not just a lack of funding that plagues the continent, far too often even when the finances are readily available delays and mismanagement could vastly diminish the beneficial effect of a project on a nation's economy. The opportunity thus exists for a financial organization like the proposed AFC to go beyond money and address the implementation of infrastructural projects. Like the IFC such an organization should have the ability to form joint-ventures in specific countries and create jobs during the execution of projects, while maintaining its focus on timely and within-budget completions.

However, seamless execution of infrastructure projects needs more input than mere funding and implementation. Vital also is that the execution of those projects undertake a knowledge transfer from foreign experts into the various government agencies that would hold a stake in those projects. In this preferred scenario, continued best-practice execution of projects is not only a consultant 'teaching/lecture' event but practical experience through Funders-Government-Private sector synergistic relationships in knowledge generation. This knowledge generation will be necessary in building the capacity for government agencies to have systems that can support innovative asset backed infrastructure funding such us infrastructure-bonds or lease-build-transfer of public assets such as Airports, Sea-ports, Railway-lines or Fibre-Optic pipes, and be able to sustain these on their own after the foreign corporations are long gone.

For example, in the now infamous Rift Valley Railway greater involvement by the Ministries of Transport and Finance would not only have led to a better deal for Kenya, but also in better returns for the IFC and a faster more effective execution of the project. Even more importantly, the knowledge transfer that would have taken place then would have facilitated similar arrangements being got into by the Kenyan government without the active involvement of a foreign entity. This is where the AFC would fill in the gap by creating the environment for effective project execution, technical implementation and the development of more innovative financing. It is true that the IFC is already in motion along this trajectory but the bad name of its parent organization and its own reputation as a rapacious vulture more in the mould of investment bankers or private equity pirates preclude effectiveness in the African economies.

To justify its existence and create value for its shareholders who are the African economies, the proposed AFC must be seen to bridge these gaps. Any effort to just make it another IFC with the mere difference being its 'purely African character' will make it nothing but another ADB. Also, the desire to be free from the dictatorship of the World Bank must not at any cost lead to an organization that yields to political pressure to make loans, back projects and award contracts as was once the case with the ADB.

The ADB which in 1995 was on the brink of collapse following month years of poor management was described as being more concerned with the amount of money it disbursed than with the quality of projects it funded. This culture of approval forced Bank staff to approve more and more loans, while paying little attention to the environmental, social and economic viability of projects. It was accused of paying too much attention to the quantity of lending and too little; perhaps even none, to its quality.

If the proposed AFC should be an effective replacement for the IFC it must focus on the value-proposition it offers to African economies over and above what they are dealt by the World-Bank, the IFC and other multilateral lenders. Key to those is the execution of projects and the selection of the very quality projects that will make radical changes to the poverty reduction efforts across the continent.