When Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia last December, John Githong'o from his Oxford
redoubt "prayed that the gates of hell have not been opened in the
region as a result of this intervention."
Three months later, Githingi's
fears of a nightmare scenario still cannot be ruled out, as evidenced
by the revolting desecration on Mogadishu's streets of dead Somali
and Ethiopian soldiers' bodies, followed by the downing of the plane
supporting the African Union peace-keepers.
Things are doubtlessly going
to get worse, because the transitional government put in place by the
invasion has shown itself completely incapable of taking the steps that
are urgently needed to avert disaster. These steps were spelled
out at a fascinating meeting organised in Addis Ababa a fortnight ago
by Ethiopia's well known Inter-Africa Group, which brought together
some of the region's most knowledgeable scholars as well as senior
IGAD and AU officials, and ambassadors from countries supporting the
transitional government.
While there was intense disagreement
on many issues, it was universally acknowledged that a politically-
and clan-inclusive approach was essential to restore peace. The representative
of Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf assured everyone that this was indeed
the government's policy.
Six days later, Ethiopian and
government troops stormed a neighbourhood of Mogadishu's dominant
Hawiye clan, which supported the ousted Islamic Courts Union and is
a rival to the Dorad clan of President Abdullahi. The assault resulted
in a large number of dead - including the reprisals mentioned above.
Few of the independent experts
at the Addis conference would have been surprised by the government's
assault. Most of them had said that an inclusive strategy would not
be pursued by Mr. Abdullahi, given his deeply clannish outlook.
So much earlier than was the
case in Iraq, the attempt to install a pro-American government in Somalia
is unravelling. The patient diplomacy needed to address a difficult
situation for the United States was eschewed in favour of the now-reflexive
Bush administration resort to force when faced with a challenge in the
Muslim world.
This is a ruinous strategy,
since its multiple post-9/11 applications have been rarely accompanied
by any certainty that they will deliver an approximately desired outcome.
In Somalia's case, for example, the US helped topple the Islamic Courts
Union and the peace they had brought, but the government put in place
has no prospect of winning national support and creating stability because
it is seen as a front for the two countries most reviled by Somalis.
The greatest indictment of President Bush's reign is that he turned
many relatively stable situations into murderous chaos, in pursuit of
short-term goals which contradicted his own strategic aim of a more
secure world for the US.
Outcome aside, this was the
most illegal war fought in recent history. It violated the UN
Charter, and also two explicit Security Council resolutions adopted
in 1993 (arms embargo) and in December (which continued much of the
embargo and forbade neighbouring countries from sending troops into
Somalia). Kenya also blemished its excellent international record by
contravening humanitarian laws by turning over scores of Kenyan and
other alleged ICU supporters to Somalia, where they might have faced
torture or death.
Underlying the multiple interventions
and failures in facing challenges from the Muslim world is the Bush
administration self-serving conflation of all Islamists with violent
extremists. If a modus vivendi with the Muslim world is to be sought,
the West must recognise that political Islam is now an established force,
and it must be engaged.
As Jennifer Cooke and David
Henek of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the US
wrote in a paper last month, "political Islam needs to be accorded
a role in deciding Somalia's future dispensation. Islamic charities,
businesses and networks remain among the country's most robust and
enduring."
If the US wishes to avoid another
protracted crisis which also has the potential to destabilise its allies
in the region, it should bring in the United Nations, which would name
a senior Special Representative who would head a new political mission
in Somalia, to which the AU peace-keepers would be subordinate. Somalis
would need to be convinced that this is a genuine attempt by non-interested
parties to create a broad-based governing coalition.
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On the other hand, the writer persists in the belief that world peace is a goal of George W's or indeed of any US government. As the maxim goes,'there's no money like blood money'. OK, I made that up.