Indeed in the 1960s and 1970s a flurry of multilateral groupings emerged such as the British Commonwealth, the Communauté française (French Community) and the Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) respectively. Whilst the Yaoundé Agreements (1963-1975) established a cooperation of sorts between Europe and Africa, the Lome Conventions (1975-2000) constituted the first real attempt at creating a trans-regional multilateral framework that sought to bring together 71 countries in an EU-ACP cooperation. 

Whilst the Lome Conventions were very comprehensive in their scope (Babarinde, 1988 in Faber, 2004), the Lome Conventions failed to realize their expected objective outcomes. This failure was characterized by the declines in markets shares held by ACP states (most notably African states), per capita incomes, the acquisition of a spiralling debt burden and diminished terms of trade, due changes in the political, social and economic climate (Faber, 2004).

Out of the Ashes of the Lome Conventions, the Cotonou Agreement was born. The Cotonou Agreement, (even more comprehensive than its predecessor), sought overcome the obstacles that had been witnessed by its precursors. Indeed the Cotounou Agreements1 were designed to more accurately reflect prevailing global realities in the political, economic and social spheres (de la Rocha, 2003). This paper will argue that although the Cotonou Agreement on paper comes across as remedy to many of the developmental afflictions faced by ACP countries due to its comprehensive nature, the Agreement is not likely to achieve the key objectives of poverty reduction but may help to improve the socio-political spaces (governance) within these countries. This paper will try to illustrate what it perceives to be the limited capacity of the agreement through a realist perspective of international relations 

As mentioned earlier, the Lome Conventions established the first real multilateral framework that sought to join together the nations of Africa, the Caribbean with the European states into an informal union. The Conventions were essentially designed to assist in the development of the ACP by giving privileged access to European markets by: allowing exports from ACP countries into these markets with exemptions on duty tax on a non-reciprocal basis and provide commodity exports compensation for declining commodity prices through two special funds named STABEX and SYSMIN2. 

However in spite of these seemingly favourable terms, at the time of expiration in 2000 the ACP countries had very little to show in the way of their progress in the world arena (Faber, 2004). Indeed in spite of the comprehensive scope, it would seem that the Conventions in reality were of little significance in trying to resolve key development problems of the ACP states and that many other factors contributed to poor performance (Faber, 2004). As mentioned earlier the commodity prices for the products produced in ACP states began to fall, significantly on the world market in the 1970s (Bates, 1983; Faber 2004). In addition to this there was a marked deterioration in Africa’s terms of trade (Bates, 1983). In spite of the fact that the Lome Conventions provided ‘cushion’ mechanisms for ACP export products the decline in the terms appeared to be almost inevitable.  According Zein Kebonang3 the decline in the terms of trade that Africa experienced could essentially be attributed to what he termed as ‘lack of access to regional and international’ markets due trade restrictions and other trade barriers (Kebonang, 2007).  

Despite the fact that the terms lineated within the conventions were renegotiated and adjusted at various points during the periodic commitment renewals, it would appear that these adjustments were essentially minor and that broadly speaking they did not come to reflect the fluxive economic realities of the time. Amongst other things attributed to the decline is what Geert Laporte, refers to as the ‘shifting geopolitical priorities’ (Laporte, 2000). He also attributes a decline in the support for aid to ACP countries as part of the ‘donor fatigue’ that has arisen to do political and economic mismanagement in these countries (Laporte, 2000).

In spite of the poor performance as it were of the Lome Conventions the belief in a trans-regional multilateral framework, as a driver of change has persisted and from the rubble of the Lome Conventions were born the Cotonou Agreements.

Cotonou Agreements 

The Cotonou Agreement, much like their predecessor, is said to be a framework that seeks to strengthen cooperation between ACP states and the EU. Although the Cotonou Agreement essentially adopts a role that is very similar to its predecessor, the Agreement differs significantly in number ways and also in the nature of the relationship that it sets between the ACP and the EU.

The main objectives of the Cotonou Agreements are poverty reduction, with the long term view towards complete eradication and the gradual integration of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries into the world economy.

The main principles stipulated within the agreement include:4

1. Equality of Partners and Ownership of Development Strategies- this essentially stipulates that ACP states are given the sole discretion in outlining the terms and mechanisms through which they deem appropriate for the development of their nations

2. Participation- this principle essentially outlines the need for the inclusion of non-state actors such as civil society and the private sector and local governments in consultations and in the implementation of key objectives of central development agendas set by the state.

3. Dialogue and Mutual Obligations- The fundamental objective behind this clause ensure that states that are signatories to the Cotonou Agreements adhere to certain international norms and ethics, such as the respect of human rights and that the dialogue

4. Differentiation and Regionalization- This clause acknowledges the differences between states and among different regions and notes the agreements will vary so as to meet the needs and the long term development objectives. It also goes on further to state that special preferences may be given to least developed, fragile and landlocked states.

Whilst the principle of equality amongst states and the notion of special preference to least developed, fragile and land locked countries is essentially a carryover from the Lome Conventions, the additional principles of Dialogue and Mutual Obligations and Participation have essentially added a new dimension to the Agreement.  In effect the inclusion of these additional principles has meant a broader legitimacy has been conferred upon the agreement as a whole as it also highlights issues of governance and institutional transformation5. 

Another critical difference contained within the Cotonou Agreement can be seen on the new emphasis put on the notion of reciprocal trade whereby customs duties levied by ACP states on EU exports to ACP markets are also in turn met with similar duty taxes on ACP products going into the EU market. This new development has been seen as necessary so as to make the cooperation in line with WTO/GATT requirements.

The Cotonou Agreement, as mentioned earlier, is thought to be even more comprehensive and salient in its scope and stipulations as it encapsulates various facets ranging from industrial sectoral finance to cultural development issue. The Agreement is said to run for a period of no more than 20 years and will be subject to a periodic revision. 

Prima facie, the Cotonou Agreements appears to be an infallible remedy but it begs to be asked, to what extent is it likely to succeed in achieving its objectives?

International Relations and Power Play

In answering the question above it is first of all important to question the role of international relations on the operation of the Cotonou Agreement as a multilateral framework. Whilst the failure of the Lome conventions has been attributed to its perceived limited impact (Laporte, 2000; Faber,2004) on the ACP states and more specifically  Africa, the role of international relations cannot be ignored. The Lome Conventions essentially created a multilateral space of cooperation between the ACP and EU in the period that immediately followed the independence to most the ACP states. It is also important to note that at the time that the Lome Conventions came into effect the Cold War was still raging. The notion of the international development policy as a strategic instrument through which to realize ideological gains in Africa is not new. Indeed the notion that the West tried to check the sino-soviet influence in Africa through the propagation of what Kofi Akosah-Sapong terms as ‘western modernization theory’ (Akinade and Sessey, 1998). It could also be argued that through the dissemination of these theories Western states were likely to remain influential in African state. Indeed it could be plausibly argued that the creation of international institutions and multilateral frameworks of cooperation could be a function of political power play. In his seminal work, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, Douglas North states that institutions are not always created for the well being of their intended recipients but are sometimes do so for the benefit of those with bargaining power.

Institutions are not necessarily created or usually created to be socially efficient rather they or  at least the formal rules are created to serve the interests of those with bargaining power to create new rules (North, 1995)

Although it would be tempting to assume that the issue of power play in the structures of the Cotonou agreement do not arise due the notion of equality or partners it would appear that this status applies more de jure than de facto. 

Terry Moe, in his essay Power and Political Institutions, says that even in the most democratic of institutions, there are nuances of power play and underlying asymmetries in power relations.

These most common of democratic institutions are often not cooperative or mutually beneficial for many of the people affected by them. They involve and exercise of power. This is so even if the democratic rules of the game are assiduously followed in their creation and design (Moe, 2005)
 
Inherent in the ideas lineated above is the notion that institutions whether bilateral or multilateral are embedded with asymmetries in the power relations as characterized in the creation and application of the rules by those who make them and who are the real beneficiaries. So in spite of the fact that one of the key principles of the Cotonou Agreement is the notion of an equality of states could this cooperation between the EU and the ACP be considered fair? 

According to Elijah Munyuki ‘The Cotonou Agreement is an unfair treaty’. In his paper, Reciprocal Trade Arrangements in the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement; Were ACP Countries Duped? He states that in its current form the Cotonou Agreement is flawed in favour of the EU states (Munyuki, 2007). In particular he cites the notion of reciprocal trade as a key facet that gives the developed countries of the EU an upper hand as it gives the contentious clause gives the EU bloc license to aggressively push for larger volumes of their exports into ACP countries due to their capacity which unrivalled by the ACP states. In empirical research done for the World Bank, Caroline Freund asserts that the notion of reciprocity as being detrimental to the overall terms of trade currently accorded to the African Continent.

Reciprocity may be especially damaging in North-South agreements, where asymmetries in size and bargaining power suggest that low-income countries will have to make relatively larger trade concessions to achieve an agreement with a high-income country; and North countries extract significantly more market access in South countries than South countries extract from the North (Freund, World Bank, 2003). 

Munyuki goes on to categorically assert that the Cotonou Agreement is a farcical document and that it is of very little benefit to the ACP states both in terms of poverty reduction and in the promotion of economic growth.

On this analysis it is laughable that the Cotonou Agreement is lauded as poverty eradicator, and a tool for the economic growth of ACP states, it will no longer have to bother with implementing its commitments under part IV of the GATT6. The ACP states were deceived (Munyuki, 2007).

The notion of unequal treaties is not at all new to the African continent as, they [unequal treaties] legally instituted colonialism on the continent. The post-colonial period was also not devoid of inequitable agreements between the developing states of Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. A vast majority of these unequal can be seen in the form of bi-lateral agreements. Whilst (Munyuki, 2007) argues for a renegotiation in terms of the agreement, it is not clear as to whether this would yield much. (Kebonang, 2007) argues that due to insufficient resources and an absence in the necessary expertise that would greatly enhance their bargaining power, at present it would be unlikely that African states would succeed in renegotiating new terms of trade. Perhaps through the power of collective action on the part of the ACP could enhance their bargaining position, as was the case at the WTO meetings in Cancun in 2003.  So given these seemingly unfavourable terms of engagement why do the developing countries in the ACP agree to be party to these uneven agreements? 

Munyuki, unequivocal in his perplexed reaction states that ‘it is not apparent why ACP states which are less developed countries would enter into deal trade agreement which places reciprocity at the very centre of the deal’ (Munyuki, 2007).  So on the face of it voluntarily entering such an agreement would appear irrational and illogical. However it could be argued that there is some method in this madness so to speak and a return to the theories on power play in multilateral institutions is in order.

According to Lloyd Gruber it is not uncommon for weaker states to join a multilateral institutions and frameworks in which they find themselves worse off. In his book Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions Gruber asserts that once a new institution is formed by key states then weaker states will join it even if their situation is made worse because at least there is always the prospect of receiving particular benefits in future which would not be possible at all outside the framework. He goes on to say,

When prime movers band together to form an institution say – to promote free trade and the coordination of the economic policies, nations that oppose such a development are faced with a fait accompli. The original status quo has been taken away from them and the new reality is that this new institution does exist. They can either join or be left out in the cold but they can’t go back to the way things were. If they now decide that joining makes them better off than not joining they will voluntarily become members (Gruber, 2000).

It would appear that the ACP states are fully aware of their predicament and this is particularly evident in the way that many African states are also diversifying their trading partners by turning to the east and doing more business with the Chinese, Indians, Malaysians, Japanese, Koreans and other key Asians nations. Countries like China have been distributing aid, development grants in addition to project implementation in Africa. Whilst the benefits of this new cooperation maybe to the benefit of the China and less to that of Africa the Caribbean and the Pacific nations, the absence of conditionalities essentially means in principle that there is an equality in bargaining power, as opposed to western paternalism that has largely come to negate the notion of an equality of partners.
 

In synthesizing all these views it becomes apparent that in as far as the power relationships are concerned the Cotonou Agreement is not working in the favour of ACP members. Indeed in is as much it is tempting to believe in the benevolence of donor countries, it is always important to remember first and foremost that in international relations La raison d'État (although in this case La raison de region7) is always the underlying theme that governs the relations between and amongst different parties. Even in this world of liberalism and collective action, the notion of national interest is seen as a rational one as states can not be considered as homogenous. Having considered all this what then are the implications for ACP states?

Implications on ACP

So having considered from an international relations perspective that the Cotonou Agreement would not work towards the benefit of the ACP does that still mean that ACP countries cannot benefit somehow from the agreement?

Going beyond the issues of trade, ACP states could benefit in the areas of: institutional reform, technical know how that includes skills transfer and the acquisition of new technologies, the protection of cultural heritage.

Given the Cotonou Agreements new emphasis on participation and mutual dialogue and obligations, ACP states and more particularly in Africa, could improve on the issues of governance. Although conditionalities on financial assistance may prevent much needed aid to ACP states and more particularly Africa, the self induced governance crisis in Africa from poor management, has had a far more detrimental effect on African states and has deprived many of its citizens of an acceptable quality of life. Indeed vices such as corruption, capital flight have had a detrimental effect up on development and growth in Africa and have resulted in large numbers of people living in poverty. So in essence whilst the Cotonou Agreements may in essence be a replicate the policies espoused by the World Bank in that regard, at least a clear message is given out that good governance is necessary prerequisite for development.

Although improvements in governance may help in the minimization of poverty (in the sense that there will be a greater sense of accountability) it is not likely that the Cotonou Agreement will lead to poverty eradication. This is so because even though ACP states may benefit from technology and skills transfer, a large part of  the international development assistance that these states receive in the form of finance goes towards debt servicing to donor states and international financial institutions IFIs8. It is therefore imperative that ACP states learn to negotiate as a single bloc. This would mean that ACP states would need to come to any revisions to the Agreement with a unitary position so as to enable themselves to negotiate better terms of trade. This may mean resisting the allure to negotiate better terms of engagement through bilateral agreements as the ACP bargaining power could collapse. 

So it can be said in conclusion that, despite the fact that final judgments on the Cotonou Agreement may be premature, this paper concludes that the Cotonou Agreement is only one of many multilateral vehicles will assist in achieving the goals of poverty reduction. However on its own it is unlikely to make that much of an impact in its current form, in spite of its comprehensive and thorough nature. On the issue of full integration into the world economy this will essentially depend upon the actions taken by the ACP states. In this era of regional integration the ACP states will have to work as a collective in any major negotions with organizations such as the World Trade Organization for them to succeed.

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