The sudden escalation of protest by Tibetans in Lhasa
and elsewhere in March 2008 has been accompanied by vigorous
rhetoric from the Chinese state reaffirming its sovereignty over Tibet
and strong counter-arguments from Tibetans claiming the right to
self-determination.
Both these positions crucially depend on historical
references and evidence for their validation. But how far does history provide
support for either?
One way to approach this question is to examine contemporary political
claims over Tibet
in light of the contending parties' use of the idea of sovereignty. Such a reading
might be said to complicate both sides' political assertions. For example, in
the early 20th century Tibetans took advantage of civil wars within China
to throw out Chinese officials and troops and make their state de facto
independent, a situation that lasted from 1913 to 1949. But this period did not
see Tibet gain
widespread recognition as an independent state, and de jure Chinese
claims of political supremacy went unchallenged. In this sense, China
retained valid historical and legal claims over Tibet.
At the same time, China's
political control of Tibet
had never been absolute. Tibet
had occupied a special place for China,
whose emperors were often Buddhists and who also found the Tibetan lamas
useful allies in efforts to pacify the Buddhist Mongols. The relationship
resembled that of patron-to-priest; it had a religious-symbolic-political
content that was alien to absolutist terms of sovereignty or independence (see
Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China
[Columbia University Press, 2005]).
The Chinese use of the European concept of absolute sovereignty gave this
relationship an extra charge. It was itself the product of two factors: the
rise of nationalism in China
in the early 20th century, and British-Indian attempts to name Sino-Tibetan
relations using European vocabulary.
In this sense, Chinese control over Tibet
can be understood through two different imperial trajectories - one Chinese and
one western. The fact that the People's Republic of China (PRC), while focusing
primarily on historical-imperial ties to legitimise its
control over Tibet, uses the modern concept of sovereignty - a product of
European universalisation through imperialism and decolonisation - shows the
significance of the western imperialist trajectory in the "scripting" of modern
Tibet.
The crucial transition
Tibetan nationality/ethnicity was from a very early stage at the core of
modern Chinese national consciousness - along with the categories of Han, Hui
(used for all Muslims), Manchu and Mongol. Meanwhile, the combination of the
impact of western (European, American and - in this context - Japanese)
imperialism and awareness of China
as being a "great continuous civilisation" made Chinese nationalism
hyperconscious of any challenge to its imagined collectivity. Thus, Tibetans
became an integral part of modern Chinese nationalism and then the nation-state
well before military "liberation" in 1950 and the "seventeen-points agreement"
in 1951. More broadly, today's Chinese regime uses nationalism as a primary means of legitimising its rule as it seeks to
combine authoritarian control with capitalist economic practices; as such, it
cannot but be paranoid about ethno-nationalism taking a political form, in
Tibet or elsewhere.
British imperialist activities in Tibet
also played an important role in transforming Chinese attitudes toward Tibet.
In particular, the Younghusband
invasion of 1903-04 was instrumental in making the Chinese elite realise
its vulnerability to hostile forces from beyond the Himalayas
to the south. The most significant aspect of the British imperial policy practiced in the first half of the 20th
century was the formula of "Chinese suzerainty - Tibetan autonomy". But this
calculated strategic hypocrisy, in nurturing ambiguity over Tibet's
political status, was not to last.
The late 1940s was a crucial period in this respect. The British withdrew
from India in
1947, and the communist victory in the civil war meant that a stable government
emerged in China
after 1949; together, these events meant that the context of the "Chinese
suzerainty - Tibetan autonomy" formula was transformed. China
since the start of the 20th century had maintained its sovereignty over Tibet,
and now was in a military position to enforce this claim and (as it saw the
situation) "liberate" Tibet.
Britain, with
the end of its empire in India,
no longer conceptualised Tibet
as strategic.
India at the dawn of its own independence was impelled by an
anti-imperialist nationalism to see the Tibet issue as a remnant of British
imperialism in the region; as a result, it was willing to accept Chinese control of Tibet without realising that what India thought was
a settled border was in fact the product of the Simla agreement between British
India and Tibet (which China, after initialling it, had then rejected as an
unequal treaty). Thus, India's
recognition of Tibet
as part of China
opened up border issues between the two states.
The Tibetans' belated attempts in the late 1940s to gain international support for
recognition of their independent status came to nothing. The PRC completed the
geopolitical scripting of Tibet
as an autonomous but integral part of China
by one of the most potent weapons of the European constitutional armoury: the
idea of sovereignty. In effect, Tibet's
geopolitical identity got translated from "suzerainty-autonomy" to
"sovereignty-autonomy"; and it was China,
not Tibet,
which found the concept of sovereignty most useful to its interests and
ambitions.
The uses of history
The story of how the "Tibet
question" has come to be framed by competing notions of sovereignty and
autonomy makes clear that the intractability of political problems in the
post-colonial world is due to other factors than longstanding historical
animosity or "essential" cultural differences. The ideas of sovereignty and
nationalism were originally western, but non-western actors have long
appropriated them to transform their own sense of political community (for a
fuller development of this argument, see my book Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination [University
of Minnesota Press, 2008].
In this project, the utility of "tradition" is as a resource for buttressing
claims to modern statehood. Those like the Tibetans who lost out at the crucial
moment of decolonisation find it hard to advance a convincing claim to be
recognised as a separate nation-state unless an existing overlord state breaks
up or other powerful countries support secession from established states. In
the case of Tibet,
neither of these conditions is in the realm of possibility; this leaves the
diasporic Tibetans under the Dalai Lama with little room for manoeuvre. A contributor to
their predicament is the fact that the west, through its imperial scripting of
modern Tibet,
has been an ally of China
in the latter's appropriation of the vocabulary of sovereignty.
The limits of the absolute
The historical contextualising of the Tibet
question is important in helping to explain the background of contemporary
political arguments. If history is understood as more than a buttress for
current positions, it may still suggest elements that could be part of a way
forward. For example, before the British imperial intervention, Sino-Tibetan
relations often accommodated mutual interests; Tibetans did not usually feel
political pressure from China
and had considerable freedom (without calling it "independence"),
while China had
recognised overall political control (without needing to invest heavily in the
region).
At some point, the international system and individual states will have to
recognise that absolutist notions of sovereignty can do more harm than good.
This would also open the way to a humane and effective solution for Tibet
within China.
For the time being, it must be hoped that the Chinese government can come to
realise that a system which allows dissent and protest can produce durable solutions, whereas one that
remains forever suspicious of its own citizens never can.
Dibyesh Anand is a reader in
international relations at Westminster University's Centre for the
Study of Democracy. He is the author of Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination (University of Minnesota Press, 2007); his book Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of Security in India
is due from Palgrave Macmillan in 2009. The author has recently secured a grant towards research on 'Going beyond Roots and Routes: Multi-Racial Economy and Cultural
Identities in Tanzania' as part of the Cambridge University led
'Changing Global Geographies of Power and Development: Contemporary
Indian - East African Relations' project.This article was first published here,
on the OpenDemocracy
website.
Trackback(0)
|