It is also true that NARC was not a union of hearts, more a union of calculating minds looking only to win the first post-Moi election. But that isn't to say that they did not try. Why then did nothing seem to work?

On the most fundamental questions, the victors at the battle that was the 2002 election found themselves fundamentally opposed. True, joint strategic positions had been taken in contemplation of the difficult task of unseating the KANU behemoth. As the old saying goes, nothing unifies more than a common enemy.

Still, the differences that rent that coalition, and pit us against each other, were so significant that it is inexplicable that scholars and pundits alike persist in blaming President Mwai Kibaki, even demonizing him, first for his alleged reneging on the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding with the Liberal Democratic Party, and secondly for his dismissal of these politicians from his government in 2005 after the referendum delivered a defeat to his government. He could, in his defense, state first that he had retained those ministers he felt he could work with even when they were not of his party  (importantly LDP's Awori, Saitoti and Tuju) and others like Kibwana and Ngilu); and secondly that his primary duty as chief executive was to deliver to the Kenyan people, not to their politicians. Certainly, the characterization beloved of many, that it was an unabashed Kikuyu power-grab is unjustified by the facts.

Time brings clarity, and the opportunity to rethink previous judgments, especially for the consideration of future leaders. The question: what would a responsible leader do faced with constant opposition from within his government, especially when such opposition was not based on mere nuances but on substantive decisions of government? How do Majimboists and Centrists govern together for example? How do populists govern in alliance with a president who infuriated even his own side with his slow and deliberate style?

These questions persist even today because the Kenyan people are governed, and will likely continue to be governed by elements of that same coalition, and earlier differences persist, troubling Kenya today in much the same way as they previously did. It is clear that in spite of all, if any effort applied, there are real, fundamental difficulties facing the coalition, real differences in their management styles, how they appeal to the public, how they take to being beaten in political battle and what historic baggage they lug with them. 

Passionately held positions are unlikely to melt in the coziness of the Cabinet Room anywhere on earth, and it is right and proper that our politicians believe in something; that they find certain positions impossible to compromise; and that they defend the positions of their voters when they need to (see Mau Forest evictions). It is simplistic and unfair to see every political disagreement as signifying an unending petulance on the part of our politicians. Differences of various kinds are not uncommon and are especially magnified in the case of Grand Coalitions. One can understand for example, given their constituencies, why Raila Odinga would prefer lower food prices, and William Ruto greater reward for farmers.

There's been, since even before the post-election violence, a refrain asking that we eschew winner-takes-all-politics, and adopt a Northern European style consensus politics.  In the case above for example, it is not possible to have it either way without real cost to our country, and compromises that serve our long term interests have to struck. It is doubtful, however, that this will be achieved soon, or that it is in our interest at our state of development, or even that it becomes our political culture. Compromises often grant stasis and therefore delay progress.

We continue to suffer an intensely adversarial politics (see Martha Karua versus William Ruto). It is undeniable that Kenyans have a way of taking as attacks on their communities what are usually attacks on individuals (see Kimunya trying hard to persuade his constituents that the campaign against him in parliament was an attack on the Gikuyu, or see the myth of Luo marginalization or the understanding that the insults against Raila Odinga at the last campaigns amounted to attacks on all Luos).  There is therefore an incentive in our political culture for politicians to look tough, see the plaudits Martha Karua has won for beating her chest (even when she completely ignores the facts).

This consensus politics is also not likely to be particularly productive. It may deliver peace and calm, but that calm may also signify little if any movement, or progress. For starters it would deny the public the opportunity to have presented to us arguments for and against particular policy decisions (you know you cannot get front page in a Kenyan newspaper unless you scream and shout).  It would lead instead to the institutionalization of backroom political deals.

Worse, it would be very expensive and ineffective, see Obama's fiscal stimulus and the effects of trying to make everyone happy. But worst of all, because we do not have an ethic that rewards cooperation and compromise, we would see the party that compromised more (there is always such a one) as weak and effeminate. Kalonzo Musyoka and Raila Odinga are both reviled by some of their previous supporters for ‘caving in' to Kibaki, even though that may have been the right, even the only thing to do at the time.

So onward, how to wean ourselves of the angry and debilitating politics? How to consult and consider alternative proposal but maintain a healthy capacity for policy argumentation and appeals to competing political interests at the voter level?

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