Having missed a previous deadline to create a special
tribunal to prosecute the masterminds of post-election violence, the Kenyan
government finally recognized it couldn't meet the August one either. Following
a deal reached in Geneva recently - in which Kenya pledged to get the tribunal
in place by July 2010* - Kofi Annan has now handed over the list of top suspects
to International Criminal Court prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, thus launching a
new chapter in this protracted drama.
Annan's move means that the so-called Hague option remains
open. As Moreno-Ocampo told Reuters, "If Kenya cannot do it, I will do it.
There will be no impunity." The Hague spectre, however, is unlikely to ease the
impasse in Parliament. Hague-option opponents continue to peddle, with success,
a dubious argument: a shallow appeal to patriotism that changes the subject,
obscures the issue at hand and seeks to co-opt the general public into the
ruling elite's anti-Hague propaganda efforts.
It's an accusatory proposition that goes like this: If you
agree to send your compatriots to the ICC, you're implicitly accepting or
endorsing the view that Kenya is a ‘failed state' (whatever that phrase means)
and contributing to the impression that our justice system is ill-equipped to
handle politically motivated crimes of the sort that end up in The Hague.
It's also a perverse dare intended to intimidate
Hague-option enthusiasts. And it's repeated at even the highest levels of
government, where politicians motivated by self-interest are stalling for time,
hoping to prevail in the end. President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga,
in whose names hundreds were killed following the disputed December 27
elections, have made it clear they prefer local prosecutions. Since the main
parties in the coalition government were tainted by the violence, the stalemate
in Parliament over the special tribunal should be seen not as a PNU-ODM dispute
but as a factional fight within the coalition government.
 |
Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo, who must be assumed to
speak for the anti-Hague faction, insists that Kenyan courts can try the
suspects locally, saying, as quoted in The Standard, "We are not a failed state
and by handing over our people to the ICC we shall be telling the world that
Kenya has failed, which is not the case." The ‘failed state' argument has
become the rallying cry of the anti-Hague faction - a fallacy being used to
inflame public opinion and turn it against the ICC.
Kilonzo's logic is manifestly faulty - hasn't Parliament so
far failed to create a system for trying the suspects at home? Aren't our
courts susceptible to political manipulations? Doesn't the intransigence of
members of Parliament signal to the general public that the politicians aren't
serious about bringing the suspects to justice? The arrogance in Kilonzo's
remarks is striking (making one wonder whether the political elite realize how
close our country came to the abyss). Yet, his reasoning isn't being
questioned.
Instead, Kilonzo's words are lauded as a mark of the proper
assertiveness one should expect from the leaders of a sovereign nation that
doesn't want to be treated like a banana republic. Since we are a nation of
mimics (if not a banana republic) devoted to the endless production and
reproduction of political banalities, the ‘failed state' fallacy has been
picked up from the Press, repeated as a legitimate argument on blogs and has
turned up in dinner-table chatter, where defensive Kenyans blinded by ethnic
loyalties spit it out as gospel, without any hint of embarrassment.
In the ensuing prattle, the debate we ought to have - how to
punish those who planned the killings and ethnic purges that pushed us to the
edge of civil war - is put off for another day. But maybe such a debate isn't
necessary. Kenyans recognize that the issue is not whether we should prosecute
the still-unnamed suspects, but whether our courts can be trusted to dispense
impartial justice in cases that may end up ensnaring some big names in the
political elite.
The general public, recalling such fiascos as Goldenberg and
Anglo Leasing, is skeptical. Ordinary citizens tend to see our courts not as
impartial dispensers of justice, but as protectors of the powerful. That's why
many of them prefer the Hague option - they can't imagine how a local tribunal
can be impartial when it's staffed by jurists selected by MPs some of whom may
become the subjects of its prosecutions. Kilonzo's vehement anti-Hague posture,
therefore, reflects not the anxieties of the public, but the nightmares of the
ruling elite.
That explains the appeal to pathos cited above - the attempt
to excite our patriotism in order to aid the ruling elite's anti-Hague
propaganda efforts, in other words, to get us all to feel like targets of an
overbearing imperialist court and tell the ICC to go to hell. Still, even if
the public were overwhelmingly in favour of a local tribunal, it looks unlikely
that such a panel would ever be created. The deadlock in Parliament threatens
to persist. And if the ICC ends up taking the cases, it'd be years before any
of the suspects goes before a judge. Hague-option opponents will have
triumphed.
_________________
* UPDATE: In fact, the deadline seems to be September 2009, rather than July 2010.
|
Actors who have argued that to cede authority to prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence to the ICC is akin to ceding Kenya’s sovereignty are having a hard time selling this argument to Kenyans. For one, in the heat of the violence, both the pro-Kibaki and pro-Raila camp were vocally shouting "Genocide" and promising that those the respective camps perceived as perpetrators would end up at The Hague. Secondly, the violence festered on because the ODM camp vowed that they had no faith in the Kenyan justice system to impartially and expeditiously handle an appeal against the disputed presidential election results. Some of these leaders are now telling us about how competent our justice system is, and how we risk undermining it if we take the ICC route. Are they genuine?
Then we have those who would like for the cases to be handled by the “neutral” and “incorrupt” ICC. ICC is not perfect but many Kenyans believe it is better than the local courts. However, it is rumored that there are people in the Waki Envelope who think their interests will be better served by the ICC and some leaders are on record boasting that their cases would not come up for hearing at the ICC until the year 2090 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v...r_embedded(by which time they must imagine they will long dead and buried).
Nevertheless, it is because of the historical negative experience with local courts and commissions of inquiry that ordinary Kenyans are perhaps yearning to spend time watching live proceedings (I wonder if our media have thought about preparing for this?) from The Hague. For those who bet that their cases will start in 2090, it may be true that proceedings are agonizingly slow and one may at times die before judgment like Slobodan Milosevic did. Still, I think it was a mistake to voice that opinion loudly. I am sure Ocampo is taking it personally especially now that he is smarting his experience with our good neighbor Omar Bashir. I am not sure other African countries will be falling over themselves to defend would be Kenyan fugitives, especially since they negotiated this Hague deal with Annan of their own free will and are likely not to be the head of state. Moreover, even internal support is not guaranteed. 2012 is a crowded field right now and The Hague will surely help to whittle down that number. Meanwhile, whether the case drags or not, if indicted, one can be assured of spending time in the cell and perhaps exercising and taking meals with Taylor, Bemba, and Karadzic amongst others. The other alternative is to seek out Kony and learn how to live in the bush, or seek out Kabuga and learn how to live in disguise.