In March 2009, a riot broke out at
Kenya's second largest University because students were not allowed to sit
their final examinations unless and until they came up with the year's fees -
One Hundred Thousand Shillings (US$1,250).
Kenyatta University, named after
Kenya's first President, is located in the heart of Kenya's coffee rich Central
Province and during the tenure of its founding father Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978)
it would have been unimaginable that the children of coffee growers wouldn't
have the money to pay for a year's fee. Kenyans, when I grew up, used to
be awestruck by the good fortune of those privileged Kenyans who grew ‘black
gold.'
Coffee, one of the most popular
beverages in the world, is also a valuable tradable commodity
internationally. Coffee futures' trading occurs at the New York Stock
Exchange where washed Arabica coffee futures contracts are bought and sold by
financial speculators.
It is estimated that there are over
700,000 Kenyan coffee farmers today. Kenya is a leading producer of
Arabica coffee yet its small holder farmers are amongst the poorest Kenyans due
to bad governance and oppressive regulation in the coffee value chain which has
spawned a dealer's and marketing cartel which has distorted price and market
forces to their advantage at the expense of the small growers. This
happened in 2005, when amendments to the industry's basic statute The Coffee
Act (introduced through the annual Finance Bill which details taxation
measures) radically altered the balance of power between coffee farmers,
regulatory institutions and the trading market to the disadvantage of the
farmers.
A
SKETCH HISTORY OF COFFEE IN KENYA
Coffee was introduced to Kenya by the
Holy Ghost Fathers Catholic Order which first farmed coffee at what is now
Saint Mary' Boy's School in the Lavington area of Nairobi. In colonial
times, coffee was a political crop and Africans were denied the right to plant
it even though coffee production was a lucrative occupation for white
farmers. The right to plant coffee was a grievance articulated by among
others Chief Koinange of Kiambu earning him punishment by the colonial
authorities.
When Africans were eventually allowed
to plant coffee it was in two districts (Kisii and Meru) of the country where
there was no competition with white farmers, and only on a prescribed
experimental basis (limited to 100 trees a farmer). White farmers formed
powerful lobby groups that influenced the provisions in the first regulatory
piece of legislation for the cash crop - The Coffee Act of 1933 - by ensuring
that the legislation prescribed that farmers would be involved in the
management of the coffee industry.
Coffee farmers agreed to finance the
operations of the various managerial, regulatory and research bodies which were
created or given responsibility under the Coffee Act by way of a statutory ad
valorem tax which the farmers themselves set voluntarily, they say, at the
time the law was enacted. It has always been their expectation that this ad
valorem tax and the Coffee Act itself would not be changed without
consultation with farmers, and for 7 decades this held true. The ad
valorem tax on the sale of coffee by farmers is 6% of the value of the
coffee at the point and time of sale.
This farmers' representation system ran
from 1933 until the Coffee Act was amended in 2001. Established under the
Coffee Act was the Coffee Board of Kenya, which had the following
functions: regulation of the coffee industry, marketing and sale of
Kenyan coffee, promotion of Kenyan coffee.
Structural Adjustment
and the Coffee Board
As Kenya's economy declined in the
1980s, the Government accepted to institute the Structural Adjustment
programmes of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund which among other
things insisted that government should get out of business and abhorred state
monopolies.
The Coffee Board of Kenya which until
that time had been responsible for both regulation and marketing of coffee was
regarded as being inefficient and it was decided by the Government to amend the
law to liberalise marketing and the auctioning of coffee to private players,
leaving the Coffee Board only to perform regulatory and promotion
functions. The farmers participated in the discussions preceding the 2001
Coffee Act's enactment, the last meeting for example took place at the Blue
Posts Hotel and in attendance were all Members of Parliament from coffee
growing areas. Among them the current President Kibaki who represented
Othaya constituency growers of coffee. At this time also many of the most
draconian provisions of the Coffee Act including the criminalisation of the
neglect and uprooting of coffee trees were removed from the law.
Marketing Agents
The law once amended created new
players in the industry called licensed coffee marketing agents who earned
commissions on the sale of milled coffee. They could be either companies
or other bodies who signed marketing contracts with farmers. To safeguard
farmers section 24(1)(a) of the Coffee Act of 2001 required that marketing
agents had either a bank guarantee of between 1 and 12 million US dollars
deposited with the Coffee Board of Kenya; or one-and-a-half times the value of
the coffee to be transacted during their operational year. To prevent
conflict of interests millers could only be marketing agents of they
incorporated a new company with separate directors. Presumably, millers
could be investors but not directors of marketing agent companies.
Transition Period
The story of the transition period is
instructive to demonstrate how vested interests can resist reform. The
Coffee Act was not operationalised on the day it was given presidential assent
in its entirety. Certain provisions were to be brought into force by the
Minister for Agriculture and certain interim measures were to be taken during a
transition period. Unfortunately the length of the time period was not
delimited and it ran for more than 8 years. So the Coffee Board was
prohibited from marketing coffee, and during the transition the three existing
millers (SOCFINAF, Thika Coffee Mills and the Kenya Planters Cooperative Union)
were appointed by law as the only licensed marketing agents in Kenya of coffee.
The Coffee Board tried to end this
transitional oligopoly but was thwarted whenever it tried to completely
liberalise the marketing of coffee by separating the role of millers and
marketing agents. Each Board that tried found itself attacked by political
interests. The KPCU initially even refused to incorporate a separate
company as required by law. The other two millers complied but their
owners are the driving force behind the new companies albeit not as
directors. This raises the question of whether the conflict of interest
safeguard actually worked. Today there are several marketing
agents. During the same period dealers also started to insist that they
too should be allowed to be marketing agents.
During the transition period there was
also generally a policy of Government to reduce entry to trade or bureaucratic
barriers to trade. Targeted in this reform were the 11 licenses issued
under section 18 of the Coffee Act by the Coffee Board, which were viewed to be
too many. They were:
1.
Category ‘A' license
to import and export clean coffee
2.
Category ‘B' to
import and export buni coffee
3.
Buni dealers license
to export buni coffee from anywhere
4.
Marketing license
5.
Millers license
6.
Roasters license
7.
Auctioneers licence
8.
Warehouseman's
license
9.
Packers license
10.
Pulping station
license
The 11 coffee licenses were
subsequently reduced by the Licensing Laws Repeal and Amendment Act of 2007 to
4. After this reduction of licenses dealers could play the role of
selling and buying, creating a big conflict of interest.
European and World
Bank Funds
Also during the same period there were funds disbursed by the European Union as
Matching Funds, which were used not to benefit farmers but to benefit lobbyists
of multinational dealers. Under the Lome Convention a multilateral treaty
that has since expired European funds on behalf of EU consumers were used to
support coffee farmers and other agricultural commodity producers in Africa,
the Caribbean and the Pacific. In the case of Kenya's coffee farmers as
fund of about Ksh 12 billion was made available to support Kenyan coffee
production, claimed from Europe by the Government of Kenya on their farmers'
behalf.
High-level corruption and obvious
political interests saw most of this fund diverted to the cereals sector.
Apart from paternalism and theft the Moi regime had no pressing reason to
economically empower farmers in the Central Kenya region, which he viewed as,
and in actual fact was, oppositionist.
A Ksh 2 billion revolving fund placed
with the Cooperative Bank of Kenya also had unintended consequences for the
unlucky farmers. Loans were given to farmers, secured by their farm title
deeds to secure working capital and farm inputs. The Tanzanian version of
this scheme (Stabex in bureaucratic slang) that worked
better at the end of the day saw direct compensation in cash to the coffee
farmers there. In Kenya instead of giving the money to the farmers to buy
input for themselves, the money was given to middlemen from whom farmers
collected fertiliser and other inputs. These inputs did produce a bumper
crop, but as seen elsewhere this eventually depressed the price domestically
for the Kenyan farmer. The farmers' loss meant that their title deeds
were seized by the Cooperative Bank, and all over Central Kenya and Eastern
Province farms are at risk of auction. Conversely, pre-recession foreign
owned coffee farms (SOCFINAF), which had easy access to cheap northern credit,
didn't suffer the same fate. Whether they enjoy freedom from these debts
waits to be seen.
Many believe that over 10 billion
shillings worth of the Stabex funds disappeared in shady rural electrification
and road building schemes. Only 135 million shillings can be traced to
the investment in a tissue culture laboratory at the Coffee Research Centre.
That the Kenyan coffee farmer is no better off for these funds is a common
opinion amongst farmers.
The Second Window
In 2005 farmers wanted to sell their
coffee directly, hence the idea of a second window. This was opposed by
the KPCU and the Minister for Cooperatives, even as it was supported by the
Coffee Board of Kenya, which wanted another marketing chain, as did the
Minister for Agriculture.
The demand by the farmers was motivated
by a price-fixing scheme in which dealers suppressed the auction price to as
low as US$ 30 per ton while millers (often the same ownership as the dealers)
charged farmers US$ 100 per ton to mill coffee delivered by farmers.
Farmers arriving at millers to collect their payments were presented with
invoices for what they owed in milling costs because of the low price their
milled coffee obtained at the auction. Throughout this period the real
world price for Kenyan coffee was never lower than US$ 300 per ton.
Records of the International Coffee Organisation show that the price paid for a
cup of coffee by consumers remained stable, and the Kenyan auction collapse
could not be justified, and indeed was only explicable as a pernicious scheme.
Agitation for direct sale by farmers
was initially opposed by government and the established millers for obvious
reasons - they didn't want competition for the three millers that had been
designated marketing agents. But the logjam was broken by the entry onto
the scene, supported by the highest levels of Government, of Tetu Coffee a coffee
brokerage, which proposed to buy every bag of Kenyan coffee available at
minimum guaranteed prices higher than those offered by the auction. The
proposal made to the Coffee Board of Kenya that almost cornered the Kenyan
coffee market. Tetu Coffee, owned by Job Kareithi a politically connected
Kenyan living in Houston, Texas advocated direct gate-sales of with guaranteed
minimums a policy which was eventually accepted after an inter-ministerial
committee of seven ministries approved the policy. The scheme failed
because Tetu could not secure the monopoly it sought and after it was revealed
the promoter was not financially stable.
Nonetheless, farmers after the
amendments to the Coffee Act, which were introduced in the Finance Bill of
2005, remained free to appoint any licensed marketing agent, and today there
are over 100 such agencies operating at the auction which sells Kenyan coffee
every week. However only about 10 are really active. But these were
not the only amendments to the Coffee Act as will be seen later.
The
Finance Bill of 2005
Every year the Minister of Finance
introduces a Finance Bill as part of the budget to Parliament. Debate on
the Finance Bill in Parliament is usually restricted to taxation and revenue
measures but for whatever reason during the final stage (3rd reading) of that
year's Finance Bill, Patrick Muiruri, MP for Gatundu, moved several amendments
to the Coffee Act of 2001 including a radical recomposition of the Board of the
Coffee Board of Kenya and other bodies responsible for policy and research
related to Coffee. Though his amendments were opposed by Martha Karua,
Mr. Muiruri's amendments held sway and section 49 of the Finance Bill did away
with the farmers elected representatives on the Coffee Board of Kenya and gave
the Minister of Agriculture to appoint as many persons as he deemed fit to the
Board instead. Three years later this amendment would provoke litigation
as farmers felt disenfranchised of their rights to representation to the board
and other bodies for the first time since 1933. It is not clear what
Government objective was to be met by this amendment as it ran counter to the
whole basis of reforms which had been carried out in the coffee sector since
the structural adjustment liberalisation phase of the 1980s and 1990s.
Coffee
Board of Kenya Composition pre-2005
Coffee
Board of Kenya Board Composition after Finance Bill -2005
8 elected
representatives of cooperatives
As many persons as
Minister of Agriculture deems fit based on interests and expertise in coffee
3 elected
representatives of plantations
Permanent
Secretary, Ministry of Cooperatives
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Trade
1 elected
representative of coffee traders
Permanent
Secretary, Min. of Agriculture
Director of
Agriculture
Commissioner of
Cooperatives
Managing Director
Coffee Board of Kenya
Coffee
Development Fund Board of Trustees Composition pre-2005
Coffee Development Fund
Board of Trustees Composition after Finance Bill -2005
5 elected
representatives of cooperatives
6 persons appointed
by Minister of Agriculture
3 elected
representatives of plantations
Permanent
Secretary, Min. of Agriculture
Permanent
Secretary, Min. of Agriculture
Permanent
Secretary, Min. of Cooperatives
Permanent
Secretary, Treasury (Ministry of Finance)
Permanent
Secretary, Treasury (Ministry of Finance)
Managing Trustee
Managing Trustee
Since they were being disenfranchised
farmers opposed the amendments to the Coffee Act. They convened a special
general meeting of the Kenya Coffee Growers Association which is the premier
farmers (small and large) lobby group in February 2006 and made resolutions to
petition the Minister of Agriculture to respect their right to elected
representatives as had been the case since the first Coffee Act of 1933.
The
Minister's Appointments of September 2008
In July 2008, the term of the last
elected directors of the Coffee Board of Kenya expired. On September 25th
2008, citing a non-existent provision of law as authority for his appointments,
William Ruto the newly appointed Minister for Agriculture appointed an 8 member
Board for the Coffee Board of Directors, none of whom were coffee farmers, and
many of whom were actually coffee traders, marketing agents and dealers.
There was uproar in the coffee farming circles but the Minister stood his
ground. Just before Parliament went on a Christmas break, a question was
asked in Parliament by the Chairman of the Departmental Committee on
Agriculture as to why the Minister had appointed the directors without
reference to Parliament as required by the controversial amendments brought by
the Finance Bill of 2005. The Assistant Minister for Agriculture asked
for two weeks to responds while conceding that the appointment procedure
appeared not to have been followed. The promised reply has never been
brought to Parliament since that time, and the departmental committee does not
appear to have any more interest in the matter.
The farmer's complaint is two or
three-fold. They believe that the Coffee Act was amended by stealth
through the last minute expansion of taxation measures in the Finance Bill of
2005 to radically reshape the composition of all elected boards on which they
had representatives - every time to their disadvantage. Further they
believe that the current Boards are invested with conflict of interest and are
suspicious of the high predominance of non-farmers and traders on the
Minister's list of appointees.
Coffee Board of
Kenya Director post September 25th 2008
Jeremy Block
Major Waluke Koyi
Eldad Riungu Mpengu
Mercy Wambui Kamau
Joseph Kipkemboi
Mathew Kepha Ndege
John K. Mwangi
Elizabeth Mueni
Kimakia
Finally farmers recalling an
Americanism argue that they are now being taxed without representation by a
board on which they are not represented, and that in excluding them from the
board of the Coffee Board of Kenya and other institutions assets which their ad
valorem tax payments built up over the years have been effectively nationalised
by the Government of Kenya. A twist of fate that is the inevitable
consequence of logic, when one thinks about it the farmers are right.
Farmers still harbour bitterness at the invoicing incident of the early years
of the transition period, and many hold current directors responsible for the
schemes that collapsed coffee prices only in Kenya.
A civil constitutional petition filed
by a farmer from Western province soon after the Finance Bill amended the
Coffee Act in 2006 still awaits a hearing date in 2009 months after the
appointment by the Minister for Agriculture. Further evidence in farming
circles of the grand conspiracy against them. This is not a paranoiac
attitude. When one examines the ramifications of the last 8 years of
official policy it is clear that the farmers have suffered several adverse
effects, even though all reforms have claimed to be for their benefit.
Conversely, at every stage of the reforms non-farmers have gained in leverage
and influence over every aspect of the pricing and profit of this most valuable
cash crop. Looking at the farmers and their pauperisation it is clear
that something very unfair has been going on in Kenya, and that despite their
sophisticated branding the intermediates are running something of a con-game on
rural folk.
Effect of the
Minister of Agriculture's Appointments
The farmers have petitioned Kenya's
President, but do not appear likely to get a reversal. Today their
political cache is much diminished. Many Central Kenyan
politicians who were once solidly behind the farmers during the days of
opposition to Daniel Moi's dictatorship appear to have a moderated view of the
political worth of the farmers cause. Many appear to have developed more
sympathy for the intermediates between the farmer and the coffee
drinkers.
In the first Kibaki administration
there definitely was attention towards boosting coffee production and farm
inputs were easier available through a voucher system by which a European Union
Fund was channelled through the giant Cooperative Bank to appointed input
(fertilisers etc...) brokers and ultimately to the farmers. Bumper crops
were realised at the time the second window was opening, but farmers had to
mortgage their farm titles and after the invoicing incident the bubble
burst.
Today, it is claimed by knowledgeable
farmers' representatives that the auction block awaits hundreds of thousands of
farmers unless there is an enlightened policy intervention. They hold out
a faint hope that if the consumer knew of their suffering they would get a
better deal, but no Kenyan press appears interested in what looks like a
fascinating story of market regulatory contamination by a special undeserving
interest the middleman. A Kenyan problem that has also recently been seen
in the maize scandal that saw the emptying of the country's Strategic Grain
Reserves by Ministry of Agriculture bosses in collusion with MPs and
businessmen.
So, if farmers have the worse end of
the deal called reform of the coffee sector, who are the winners? A
casual search of the controlling hands and directorships of the companies
between the farmer and the consumer in Europe or the United States tells a
sorry tale of a cartel which appears to have insinuated itself into free market
reforms and cunningly transformed itself into a shadowy system of gatekeepers
extracting unwarranted share of the black gold which 700,000 poor farmers grow
in Kenya.
Three-and-a-Half
Million Victims
There are over 300 cooperative
societies of coffee growers in 6 of Kenya's 8 provinces. 700,000 farmers
are registered as growers and with their dependants it is estimated that 3.5
million Kenyans depend on coffee for a living, even without counting the
industry and trade that surrounds this bitter beverage.
On June 9th 2009, this issue of
illegal gazettment of Coffee Board Of Kenya was in Parliament. Coffee Board of Kenya - Illegal Gazettment - Hansard - June
9th 2009 as you will see there has been no action for the coffee
farmers. This is likely to be the position we put our airports in if we allow
the finance Bill to be passed without ammending Mr Uhuru Kenyatta's proposal to
Parliament. "mambo ni yale yale"
Mars Group Kenya
About the author:
From Dictatorial Impunity to Democratic
Accountability in Kenya, Mars Group Kenya is a leadership, governance and
accountability web portal for Kenya since 2006.