In reading Nanjala Nyabola's article of yesterday, I have
found myself appalled at the myths that pass for truth in Kenyan discourse, and
especially that such myths proceed to become the basis upon which political
decisions and alliances are made.
Take for example the account on President Jomo Kenyatta and the opening of the New
Nyanza Hospital
in Kisumu. It is true that Kenyatta's bodyguards opened fire on crowds, but
this was only after the crowd at the rally heckled and threw stones at him. The
security forces certainly overreacted, but it is inappropriate and misleading
to suggest that the victims were shot because they were Luo; the violence broke
out because hotheads at the rally attacked first, because the bodyguard had
reason to believe that its employer was in danger. This has clear implications for this year's riots as well, especially with politicians claiming that the police are aiming to kill members of certain tribes.
The evidence - you might like to begin by checking out this link here - that Odinga was fomenting a rebellion against the state in those early years of independent Kenya, is decisive.
In 1964, he accepted Soviet money to set up the Lumumba Institute - a Communist
training school. In 1965, he imported Soviet weapons and military technicians.
Some KANU party members trained at the Institute attempted to take over the
party in July 1965. President Kenyatta, quite rightly, considered Odinga's
actions treasonable and a threat to national security. It is also true, however
tense the Cold War world was, that Kenyatta met the threat with unnecessary and
counter-productive brutality the effects of which have perhaps trickled down to this day.
Nanjala also writes on the Rift Valley clashes. According to the Kennedy Kiliku report of September 1992, refer here ,
778 people died in the 1992 clashes. Those killings took place over a much longer
period of time. The post-election violence this time has, especially in the
Rift Valley, been better-organised and far more vicious than it was in 1992.
This is why far more people have been displaced this time round (c. 250, 000 as
opposed to c. 70, 000 in 1992). Even the later Akiwumi Report, July 1998 listed those killed in ethnic clashes between 1991 and 1994 at 800 with 130,000 displaced.
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refugees fleeing Kenya
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Another pointer of the extremity of the
violence this time is the fact that the refugees are so many and so terrified
that many have fled outside our borders, into Uganda
and Tanzania. Few
refugees fled to Uganda
in 1992; now, there are already c. 30, 000 there. Further, the specific 2007
atrocities have been significantly more brazen and cruel: there was no
equivalent of the Eldoret church burning in 1992. 2007's death toll will
eventually be significantly higher than that of 1992: there are already c. 600
confirmed deaths, but the violence and displacement is continuing, and bodies
continue to be discovered in places far from the beaten track. The heightened
viciousness and effectiveness of the 2007 violence is not an artefact of the
intensification of media attention.
In Nanjala's article, lies the claim that Mungiki is the most dangerous armed
group now operating in Kenya.
Minister John Michuki's tenure in government has seen Mungiki close to wiped
out as a serious instrument of violence. This started during his time at the
Ministry of Transport where his reorganisation of the matatu business deprived the
group of its main source of income. He continued this campaign in his time at
the Ministry of Internal Security where his extraordinarily brutal anti-Mungiki
campaign of 2006-7 severely depleted its numbers. This is precisely why
Mungiki's leaders changed tack and sought political office on their own
account: see Ndura Waruinge running for parliament in Lang'ata.
These facts, the destruction of Mungiki, probably explain why
the violent reprisals against the mass murder and ethnic cleansing of Kikuyu
(and other tribes) in RVP and Nairobi
have been both ineffective, and easily put down (e.g. those in Langas, Burnt
Forest, and Dandora). The groups
attempting these reprisals have none of the organisation, unity or ruthlessness
of the old Mungiki. This factor also explains the paucity of violence
(especially anti-Luo violence) in Central Kenya which
has on the whole been an oasis of tranquillity; see, for example, this week's Economist.
When the violence began, I feared that there would be reprisals against Luos in
Central Kenya and so organised an evacuation for some
Luo friends. None of them suffered any assault or injury, many have been able
to return, and one of them, who owns rather prominent business premises, was
surprised to find them entirely intact.
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In view of the openly anti-Kikuyu, anti-Kamba and anti-Kisii nature of the violence (a
fact that even the international media has managed to spot); in view of the
fact that most of the recorded deaths have occurred in RVP and Nairobi, and the
fewest in Central; in view of the efficiency of the Rift Valley militias; and
in view of the Reuters report that Mungiki was having to be mobilised (which
implies that they were having to recruit and build strength, and therefore
implies that they are, at best, under-strength and unprepared) there is no
serious case for the claim that Mungiki is now the most dangerous armed group
in Kenya. A dangerous militant group would not need to be roused to a fulfilment
of its raison d'être.
Much of the violence in Nairobi has
been Luo targeting Kikuyu and members of other tribes supposed to have
voted PNU. This is especially evident in Kibera where there has been a
deliberate and concerted attempt by Luo residents to remove Kikuyu and Kamba
altogether. In the early days, the aim of some of the violence seems to have been
to confine Kikuyu, Kamba, and other 'PNU tribes' to small, demarcated and easily-monitored
areas, but the more recent attacks seem designed completely to remove them from
the slum. This explains the predominance of Kikuyus and Kambas at the Jamhuri
Park camp. Assuming the Red Cross
definition of ethnic cleansing - forcibly displacing or exterminating an ethnic
population from a particular area in order to assert the identity and power of
another ethnic group - is roughly correct, recent events in Kibera can be accurately
described as ethnic cleansing .
In the Rift Valley Province, the picture is much clearer. The militias now in
operation have explicitly admitted that their orders are to expel from the Rift
Valley all Kikuyu, Kisii, Kamba, and other groups supposed to have voted against
the ODM, see murder of 40 Kisii teapickers at Unilever's Kaptein Tea Estate, and anguished letter from Baraton . This seems to be the resounding report from the province, whether from
the assailant gangs, the victims or the neighbours of the victims. In view of
the fact that more than 250, 000 people have been displaced, more than half of
them Kikuyu (and most of the rest Kisii and Kamba); and in view of the
definition given earlier, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that ethnic
cleansing is in progress.
All that aside, I share her fear of the irrationality of ethnic conflict. But
the characterisation of present violence as ethnic is substantially correct.
Those committing the violence have openly admitted that the violence is
motivated by ethnic considerations and that their victims have been selected on
ethnic grounds.
I remember seeing an interview with one of the Nairobi protesters on Citizen Television.
He began by expressing his anger with the government's failings but, as he
continued, the code words slipped away: he claimed the youth were unemployed
because all managers were Kikuyu and wouldn't employ non-Kikuyu. Since Kibaki
was a president for the Kikuyu, it was time to completely remove him and them -
by violence if necessary. That little cameo accurately summarizes what's
happened in Kenya
since 2005.
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immediately after the election results announcement, many individual acts of violence has been committed before. The Kenyan (!) media were full of reports about it between 27th and 30th of December, you just seem to have blocked them out of memory, maybe due to the overshining "halo effect" of the later more massive and more widespread violence. 
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Its unfortunate to see you hold that opinion even after its been clearly said to be a peaceful rally.
That force was not needed especially to a protester only making monkey faces to a cop.
To imagine as long as Kenyaimagine is operational the above comment will be associated with your handle.. very sad.