The reformation of our culture of politics, explained in Part 1 of this
essay to be as important as the reform of our political institutions
entails an analysis of how each of our other choices for
institutional organization would work to curb the vices and weaknesses
of our present political culture.
In this spirit, if we take a look at the particular
form of hybrid government that has been proposed by the Committee of Experts, can it be
in doubt that it does little to reform our political culture?
The
emphasis in this option is clearly on power sharing within the executive
as a means of avoiding the consolidation of power by a single individual.
But does this really begin to curb the vice and weaknesses of
our political culture?
In this power-sharing arrangement, power remains
the end; the executive remains a prize to be won and not a duty to be
performed. Only this time the prize is to be shared between different
factions, which are by and large grouped along tribal lines, and not
any particular ideology.
In our current dispensation, ministerial positions are
to be doled out in recognition of the appointee's ability to deliver
tribal support to the alliance, and not because he or she presents a
professional character fit to perform the duties at hand. Under the CoE's suggested system, parliament would
remain coupled to the executive in a debauched union that elevates power
dealing over and above the public interest.
The people's will, once
expressed, will be disregarded in a perpetual play of politics, as our
politician's own selfish ambitions are given free reign to haggle over the nation's destiny and dominate the public interest with petty
intrigues. In-fighting within the executive will continue to be carried
over to the political arena, where jingoism and demagoguery will be used
to contest the differences, and individuals will choose their
positions on the matter largely on the basis of tribal affiliation.
The memory is still fresh with us of
what can happen in this country if we continue with a system that sends
us to the election contest divided along tribal lines. As long as the
convenience of tribal based configurations of support is not, to
the largest extent possible, discouraged within the structure of our
political system, politicians will continue to pay lip service to
practical solutions while always taking the much easier route of
appealing to tribal sympathies in the quest for numbers. Reason cannot
prevail under such conditions, and when the stakes are high enough, it
is a good bet that violent conflict will be sure to break out.
The
same goes for a purely parliamentary system, where the principal of
separation of powers is not adhered to, and instead party politics is
permitted to direct the running of the executive, the chief
implementation arm of the government. Given our under-developed party
platforms,in which tribal affiliation is valued over ideology,
parliamentarism would only provide for the perpetuation of power
politics, and accountability,particularly in the executive, would
remain hard to come by.
There would be no safeguard that the
people's will, expressed in an election, would find itself translated
into public policy in a timely and effective manner. In short, the
people's interests would remain hostage to political intrigue.
Also, while
arguments in favor of this form of government have been largely
proffered with examples of its relative success in other countries, the
proponents thereof have usually failed to indicate what our respective
societies and political cultures have in common. In most
western countries where it is practiced, for instance, the early
development of political ideology has been a major factor in ensuring
its effectiveness. This, however, has not always guaranteed stability or
protection of the public interest, and governments have been routinely
thrown out at a whim, as the political process is hijacked to serve the
interests of power and power-dealing.
In Kenya, given the facts about
our society and our political culture, such power-dealing can easily
degenerate into extreme factionalism, where tribal sympathies, prejudice
and resentment threaten not only the stability of the government, but
that of the entire country as well. This leaves us with the purely
presidential option, which, in this case, must be regarded as a purely
presidential executive structure within a devolved system of government.
This is important because devolution must be seen as a significant means
of circumventing the concentration of powers within the
presidency. Devolution that grants the right of local self-determination
will not only serve to bring to an end the politics of patronage and
patrimony, but will also allow for a distinction to emerge between local
and national politics. This last will mean that local interests and
local discontent cannot be hijacked by unscrupulous politicians seeking
to further their own ends at the national level.
A person running for
office as a member of the national assembly will propose his or her
candidacy to the constituents on the basis of legislative matters, and,
being successful, will be held largely accountable on that basis. Such a
person will then not be eligible to serve in the executive unless he
or she is ready to give up their parliamentary office, which will help
to depoliticize the executive and maintain a separation of powers where,
again, a clear criterion of accountability becomes possible.
Separation of powers will also allow for the establishment of an
effective system of checks and balances using power to check power.
Such
a system will be less vulnerable to manipulation on the basis of whim,
caprice or political machination, and will restrict the exercise of
power to the limits of the law while providing enough of a safeguard
that the entire government system is functionally oriented towards
effecting the will of the people. In this form of government, the
executive will be, to the greatest extent possible, depoliticized,
and provided with the room to effectively assume its role as the
chief implementation arm of the government.
Persons vying to be elected
to head this office will, every five years, present differing but
uniting agendas of national priorities to the people, and the election
of the winning candidate will be taken as an expression of the people's
approval of his or her set of priorities. Armed with such a mandate,
that person will be allowed to constitute the executive within the laws
and begin in earnest on the task of implementing those priorities as
identified by the people.
Parliament, as the representative body of the
people, will play a role in this; first, as a check against the abuse of
executive powers; and second, as a kind of filter through which any
plans of the executive that require legislative backing are
further scrutinized to ensure that they serve the interests of the most,
and not just of a few or even an electoral majority. If this person
manages to complete a whole term in office, then he or she will be
eligible to present him or herself before the people to have his record
assessed by his employers, and stand to be reelected to a second and
final term in office.
Within such a configuration of power, the
executive will be reasonably empowered to effect the peoples' choices on
national priorities, and accountability will ultimately rest with the
person who has secured that mandate. Here at last, we have the making
of a rational and coherent political system, where there is clarity and
unambiguity in the delegation of power, and where a robust system of
checks and balances serves to ensure that our politicians' ambitions are
closely allied to the peoples' interests. Only with such a system can we
Kenyans begin to get successive governments that truly work for us and
that manage to get things done.
And this finally brings me to the second
thing that the PSC must have realized in its delivery of this fine compromise. And that is that the overhaul of
an entire constitution is of necessity a revolutionary moment requiring
transformational change. What we seek to do in this review process is to
overthrow a way of running public affairs that we have deemed to have
failed us, and to institute in its stead a new order, radically counter
to it, where knowledge and ideas will triumph over ignorance, prejudice
and narrow-mindedness, where issues-based politics will take pride of
place above demagoguery and tribal jingoism, and where equal rights and
equal opportunity,and the rule of law, will be upheld over all forms of
impunity.
Looking at the three options of government as we have done, it
cannot be in doubt that the presidential option presents the most
radical, and yet at the same time, the most promising departure from
that old way of doing things. It should therefore behoove us to be
willing and committed to take the revolutionary step of instituting this
option, secure in our knowledge and belief that it will serve to help
bring about that new dispensation that we have long desired.
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