Kenyans have done little important imaginative work since
Independence. Kenyans who aren't poor hate those who are. That these two facts
are interestingly connected is not obvious. It should be.
First, present political arrangement have brought us as far as they can, and this was
obvious some time ago; they survive at least partly because Kenyans haven't produced
any compelling alternative. We're better at making the most of what we have
than we are at finding new possibilities; we're more inventive than
imaginative. Since Kenyans are quite inventive, their imaginative
dullness is hidden from themselves and others.
Second, it's worth softening the claims a tiny bit. It's possible that
there has been some really powerful imaginative stuff done since Uhuru.
I just don't see it; this probably says more about me than it does anything
else. Loathing and contempt for the poor -- at least the poor people as a class
-- is significantly more fervent in the middle and upper middle classes than
it is among the well and truly rich.
It's unclear just why that's so, but
here's a guess. There are few seriously rich Kenyans outside politics; reliance
on the poor for power must aid respect of the poor as a class. Kenyatta and Moi
appear to have lacked contempt for the poor, without sentimentalising poverty. Alternatively, there's the more obvious
explanation -- pressed by several readers of a draft -- that the middle classes
are closer to the poor, and many of them only precariously middle-class. Reason enough to seek to distinguish themselves from the poor by sharpening
the distinctions.
I once saw a well-dressed Kenyasian woman of a certain age hand out bread to
beggars outside her shop. She had bought it in advance; the beggars knew she
would be giving loaves away, which is why there were so many of them. (It's a powerful image isn't it? I sort of
liked the biblical resonance.) Which resonance wasn't spurious. Her gift was
neither niggling or demeaning because it was given in love: they were people to
her -- dependent, desperate, vulnerable -- but people still. It was hardly the
feeding of the 5, 000, but she loved them; and she loved them only because she
could see what it was like for them.
Race and class are quite hard boundaries in most places,
especially so in Kenya. No sympathy, no love. Her sympathy matters for the
boundaries across which it had run. That's a trick you can pull off only if
you've an ideology or a powerful imagination (or both).
In her case, I'm willing to bet, it was the imaginative stuff that had done the
trick. (Kenyans being insusceptible to every form of non-religious or
non-ethnic ideology.)
All this was on Kimathi street, to
maintain the love theme. She could sympathise because she could imagine
-- and therefore feel -- what it was like to be poor in Nairobi. The middle
classes and the poor are divided by ethnicity, language and culture -- and ever
more rigidly by location. In a country as anti-ideological as Kenya, only
sympathy could make the poor matter. Sympathy is impossible without imagination. Imagination works
subtly: it made the poor possible objects of concern, and it then moved her to
act. To see the poor, to make the poor matter, needs work; the death, or anyway
dearth, of imagination makes that work impossible.
Precolonial societies offered plans of life. Those life
plans could accommodate the poor and the not-poor, because the not-poor had, crudely
and anachronistically put, enforceable obligations to the poor. Honourable
poverty was possible. Those ways of life -- those plans of life -- are dead;
honourable poverty is basically impossible. Jonathan Lear's Radical Hope has
powerful things to say about the necessity of imagination
when a way of life passes: without it, the death of a culture is just plain
death.
It's instructive that Kenyatta had two attempts to imagine a nation, both of
which shared a fatal flaw. The invention of the Gikuyu in Facing Mount Kenya
and the attempt to invent Kenya
are in trouble because they both turned out to be republics of wealthy old men.
Then, as now, acquisitiveness
filled the imaginative gap; the place to catch the victory of the sheer hunger for
cash is in the aspirations of schoolchildren who're old enough to have them - the
aim, and the only aim, is to make lots of it, and quickly. Slightly older version of those children -- Mau Mau then, PEV now -- have put paid to both projects.
The middle classes lack the imagination
that would allow sympathy and therefore solidarity with the poor. And they lack
the imagination to put together an alternative way of life. Faced, in the fact
of the dishonoured poor, with decisive proof of their impotence, middle-class
dissonance is resolved by denying that the poor have very much (or any) value
at all. Without a place for the poor, their need is experienced as an assault.
Hence the hate.
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And can this argument be flipped? Just for a split second, just enough to flirt with the idea of a 'class' being an 'actor.' Perhaps the poor lack the wisdom to realize that their agenda will much be strengthened by building solidarity with the middle class (as opposed to destroying their property) as indeed it is elements of the middle class that sit almost everywhere that matters, from the halls of the legislature where laws are crafted (and drafted?) to the corridors of bureaucracy where budgets are drawn, priorities charted and rules implemented. More pragmatism than imagination.
End of flirtation.